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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Douglas White appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation, contending the district court denied his due process right to confront 
witnesses at the revocation hearing. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
In 2010, the state charged White with felony driving under the influence. 
(R., pp.26-27, 43-44.) White pied guilty and the court imposed a unified five-year 
sentence with two years fixed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.46, 61-64.) At 
the conclusion of the jurisdictional review period, the court placed White on 
probation. (R., pp.71-76.) 
In December 2013, the state charged White with driving under the 
influence and driving without privileges in Kootenai County Case No. CR-2013-
24814 ("2013 Case"). (R., p.104.) As a result, the state filed a motion for 
probation violation, alleging White violated his probation by committing two new 
crimes. (R., pp.102-103.) After taking judicial notice of the probable cause 
determination and related court minutes in the Case 2013, the district court found 
White violated his probation. (See generally Tr., pp.6-10.) The court revoked 
White's probation and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.121-123.) White filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (R., pp.126-127.) 
1 
ISSUES 
White states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Did the district court violate Mr. White's right to due process 
when it denied him the right to confront witnesses and lowered the 
State's evidentiary burden during the probation evidentiary 
hearing? 
2) Is the district court's finding, that Mr. White violated the 
terms of his probation, clearly erroneous? 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. At the revocation hearing, the court considered the court minutes and 
probable cause determination made in the criminal case that served as the basis 
for the state's probation revocation allegation. White had the opportunity to 
present evidence at the revocation hearing, but did not. Has White failed to show 
his right to confrontation was violated at his probation revocation hearing? 
2. Has White failed to establish the district court applied the incorrect legal 
standard in determining he violated his probation or that documents from another 
case, which are relevant to the probation violation alleged, do not qualify as 




White Has Failed To Establish He Was Denied His Due Process Right To 
Confront Witnesses At His Probation Revocation Hearing 
A. Introduction 
White contends his due process right to confront witnesses at his 
probation revocation hearing was violated. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) More 
specifically, White argues that the state failed to "provide any justification for 
failing to produce witnesses, and, due to that error, the district court was not able 
to weigh the State's interest in failing to produce witnesses against [his] right to 
confront witnesses." (Appellant's Brief, p.5.) White's argument fails because it 
presumes that the state was required to produce a witness in order to establish 
that White violated his probation. The state was not, however, required to do so. 
That the state proved White's probation violation through documentary evidence 
from the probable cause determination in the 2013 Case does not mean White 
was deprived of his due process right to confront that evidence as White had the 
opportunity to call witnesses at the revocation hearing and challenge the state's 
evidence. His failure to do so cannot form the basis of a due process violation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The admission of evidence at a probation revocation hearing is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion while the "determination whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied is subject to free review." State v. Rose, 144 
Idaho 762, 765, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (2007) (citations omitted). 
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C. Because White Had The Opportunity To Challenge The Evidence Against 
Him, He Cannot Establish A Due Process Violation In Relation To His 
Probation Revocation Hearing 
Prior to White's probation revocation hearing, the state filed a motion to 
take judicial notice "of the Magistrate Court's finding of probable cause following 
a preliminary hearing held on February 21 5\ 2014 that [White] committed the 
crime of felony DUI as well as the earlier finding of probable cause by the 
Magistrate Court that the defendant committed the crime of DWP as alleged in 
the March 5, 2014 Report of Probation Violation." (R., p.116.) At the revocation 
hearing, the state did not call any witnesses, but relied on its prior motion to take 
judicial notice as the evidence in support of its probation violation allegations. 
(Tr., p.3, Ls.15-25.) In response, White did not dispute that he had the ability to 
confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing, but contended he had a separate 
right to confront witnesses at the probation revocation proceeding. (Tr., p.6, 
Ls.15-17 ("certainly there was a hearing in front of the magistrate on that where 
we were allowed to question the witnesses and that sort of thing"); p.7, Ls.13-14 
(expressing right to confront witnesses at revocation proceeding); p.8, Ls.5-9 
(same).) The court granted the state's request to take judicial notice and found 
White violated his probation by driving under the influence as alleged in the 2013 
Case. 1 (Tr., p.7, Ls.11-12 ("I'm taking judicial notice of what's in this file."); p.9, 
Ls.1-5.) The court thereafter revoked White's probation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-6.) 
1 The court did not find a violation based on the allegation that White drove 
without privileges because the state did not present any evidence in relation to 
that allegation. (See Tr., p.9, Ls.5-21.) 
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White asserts he was denied his right to confrontation at his probation 
revocation hearing because the state failed to offer any reason for failing to call 
witnesses and, as a result, the district court could not find good cause for 
depriving him of his right to confront witnesses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) 
Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses in relation to a 
probation revocation hearing, a probationer does enjoy a Fourteenth Amendment 
due process '"right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses' unless the 
district court 'specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation."' Rose, 
144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
489 (1972)). While White is correct in his assertion that the state did not provide 
any justification for not presenting witnesses at his probation revocation hearing, 
the question presented in this case is whether the state was required to do so or 
whether it could proceed based on the documentary evidence from the 2013 
Case, which formed the basis of the alleged probation violations in this case. 
Because the state could proceed in this manner, and because White had the 
I 
opportunity to challenge the state's evidence, he has failed to show any due 
process violation at is probation revocation hearing. 
The due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses at a 
parole revocation hearing was established by the Supreme Court in Morrissey, 
408 U.S. 471, and was extended to probation revocation proceedings in Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (holding "that a probationer, like a parolee, 
is entitled to a preliminary and final revocation hearing, under the conditions 
specified in" Morrissey). In deciding what process is due in revocation 
5 
proceedings, the Court first noted the well-established principle "that due process 
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 481. For revocation proceedings, the 
"situation demands" the equivalent of a "preliminary hearing to determine 
whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the 
arrested parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole 
conditions." kl at 485. "At the hearing the parolee may appear and speak in his 
own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or individuals who can give relevant 
information to the hearing officer." kl at 487. In addition, "[o]n request of the 
parolee, [a] person who has given adverse information on which parole 
revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his 
presence." kl This request may, however, be denied "if the hearing officer 
determines that an informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity 
were disclosed," in which case the individual "need not be subjected to 
confrontation and cross-examination." kl 
The Court characterized the second stage of revocation proceedings as 
the "Revocation Hearing." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487. This hearing should be 
held "prior to the final decision on revocation" "if [the hearing] is desired by the 
parolee." kl at 487-488. "This hearing must be the basis for more than 
determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any contested 
relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant 
revocation." kl at 488. At the Revocation Hearing, the parolee "must have an 
opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the 
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conditions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation 
does not warrant revocation." kl 
Although the Court in Morrissey articulated the "nature of the process that 
is due" in parole revocation proceedings, it left to the states the responsibility of 
establishing the procedures necessary to satisfy due process. 408 U.S. at 484, 
488. To guide the states, the Court summarized the "minimum requirements of 
due process" as including: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure 
to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard 
in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) 
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless 
the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 
confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a 
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial 
officers or lawyers, and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as 
to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
In concluding its opinion in Morrissey, the Court made two significant 
points regarding the limited nature of the due process right available at 
revocation proceedings. First, the Court stated: 
We emphasize there is no thought to equate this second stage of 
parole revocation to a criminal prosecution in any sense. It is a 
narrow inquiry; the process should be flexible enough to consider 
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would 
not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial. 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
Second, the Court said it had "no thought to create an inflexible structure 
for parole revocation procedures." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490. Rather, the due 
process requirements it articulated were not intended to "impose a great burden 
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on any State's parole system" or facilitate "delaying tactics and other abuses 
sometimes present in the traditional adversary trial situation." kl For example, 
the Court noted, a parolee "[o]bviously ... cannot relitigate issues determined 
against him in other forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is 
based on conviction of another crime." kl 
"Several Idaho cases further shape the contours of proper due process in 
the context of probation revocation." State v. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 871, 
292 P.3d 258, 262 (2012). In fact, before the United States Supreme Court 
addressed the issue, the Idaho Supreme Court "presciently adopted standards 
similar to those announced in Morrissey, holding that certain procedures must be 
followed in any probation proceeding," including the right "(1) to present favorable 
evidence; (2) to examine all the material contained in any pre-sentence 
investigation report, and (3) to explain and rebut adverse evidence." State v. 
Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 721 P.2d 1248 (1986) (citing State v. Edelblute, 91 
Idaho 469, 480, 424 P.2d 739, 750 (1967)). Post-Morrissey, and with Morrissey 
in mind, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the proposition that due process 
requires "that certain information must be gathered by certain individuals," noting 
"such a rigid rule would render inflexible that which must be flexible." Chapman, 
111 Idaho at 152, 721 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis original). The Court explained: 
What is important, and what is constitutionally required, is 
that the district court be permitted to evaluate a broad range of 
information. To that end, ... , and for that very reason, did this 
Court in [prior cases] state that a defendant has the right to present 
evidence and explain and rebut any adverse evidence. 
Requiring a certain individual to collect certain information 
does not fulfill any constitutional purpose. The teachings of 
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Morrissey, Gagnon, Edelbute, and [State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 
454 P.2d 51 (1969)] are clear. They unequivocably [sic] state that 
the reason for the attachment of due process protection to 
proceedings such as we have here is to assure that the finding of a 
parole or probation] violation will be based on verified facts and that 
the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate 
knowledge of the parolee's behavior. That purpose is not furthered 
by requiring that certain sources of information be acquired by 
certain individuals, and we so hold. 
Chapman, 111 Idaho at 152, 721 P.2d at 1251 (emphasis original, brackets, 
quotations and some citations omitted). 
Consistent with the foregoing principles, a district court may consider a 
wide variety of information in relation to a revocation decision and is not subject 
to the restrictions set forth in the Idaho Rules of Evidence. State v. Egersdorf, 
126 Idaho 684, 889 P .2d 118 (Ct. App. 1995) ( citations omitted) ("In a probation 
revocation proceeding, the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not apply."); see also 
I.R.E. 101 (e)(3) (rules of evidence inapplicable to proceedings "granting or 
revoking probation"). Although the admission of evidence at a revocation hearing 
is not "unbridled," evidence is admissible "if it is found to be credible and 
reliable." State v. Nez, 130 Idaho 950, 953, 950 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Ct. App. 
1997). Thus, for example, Idaho appellate courts have affirmed the admission 
and consideration of laboratory reports showing positive drug test results when 
those reports are determined to be credible and reliable. See, sLll., State v. 
Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 805-806, 964 P.2d 670, 672-673 (Ct. App. 1998); 
Egersdorf, 126 Idaho at 685-686, 889 P.2d at 119-120. 
At the revocation hearing, White did not challenge the credibility or the 
reliability of the probable cause finding or the court minutes related to the 2013 
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Case. (See generally Tr.) Instead, White claimed he had "a right of 
confrontation." (Tr., p.7, Ls.21-22.) The district court's acceptance of the finding 
and court minutes from the 2013 Case did not, however, deprive White of that 
right because nothing prevented White from producing witnesses to challenge 
that evidence. The opportunity to do so is all that due process requires. See 
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487 ("On request of the parolee, [a] person who has given 
adverse information on which parole revocation is to be based is to be made 
available for questioning in his presence."); Chapman, 111 Idaho at 152, 721 
P.2d at 1251 (holding that the due process rights related to probation revocation 
proceedings are "not furthered by requiring that certain sources of information be 
acquired by certain individuals" and noting that "Chapman had full opportunity to 
submit evidence on these matters"). 
White relies on Farmer, supra, to support his assertion that the district 
court was required to engage in a balancing test before considering the state's 
documentary evidence in lieu of live testimony. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The 
state acknowledges that the Court in Farmer engaged in such an analysis; 
however, the question is whether the Court was required to do so. The state 
submits it was not because the good cause analysis only applies when the 
probationer or parolee is prevented from questioning an adverse witness. This is 
consistent with the right as it was articulated in Morrissey where the Court noted 
that the parolee could request to question an adverse witness, but the hearing 
officer could prevent such questioning if he "determine[d] that an informant would 
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be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S. 
at 487. 
In Rose, although the Idaho Supreme Court referenced the "good cause" 
exception to confrontation, it did not address the question presented in this case 
- whether the district court must engage in a good cause analysis when it 
considers documentary evidence. 144 Idaho at 766, 171 P.3d at 257. Rather, 
the question before the Court in Rose was whether the Supreme Court's decision 
in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), "applies to a probationer's right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses in a revocation hearing." 144 Idaho at 
765, 171 P.3d at 256. The Court concluded it did not, stating: "Due process 
does not require that probationers be granted an absolute right of confrontation, 
but only a limited right, subject to denial for good cause. Nothing in Crawford 
indicates that the due process standard set out in Morrissey is no longer valid." 
1.9.:_ at 767, 171 P.3d at 258 (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489). Notably, the 
Court also reiterated that 
due process is flexible in scope, and the reliability it demands 
necessarily invites inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the 
evidence sought to be admitted and whether it possesses enough 
earmarks of reliability. A probation decision involves an 
individualized evaluation of the probationer's personality and 
circumstances. The process must be flexible enough to consider 
evidence that might not be admissible in a criminal prosecution. A 
court is presumed to be able to ascertain the relevancy and 
reliability of the broad range of information and material presented 
to it and to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable. 
Rose, 144 Idaho at 767, 171 P.3d at 258 (quotations and citations omitted). The 
Idaho Supreme Court's reiteration of these fundamental principles supports the 
state's position that the good cause analysis is limited to circumstances in which 
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the probationer or parolee is prevented from confronting adverse evidence. 2 
Indeed, the district court specifically relied on the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Rose in proceeding as it did. (Tr., p.8, Ls.17-24.) 
Because the district court did not prevent White from calling any 
witnesses, White was not deprived of his right to confront the evidence against 
him and the court was not required to engage in a good cause analysis. 
Even if a good cause analysis was required, any error in not explicitly 
conducting such an analysis was harmless because White had the opportunity, 
at the preliminary hearing in Case 2013, to cross-examine the witness whose 
testimony served as the basis for the court's determination that White violated his 
probation by driving under the influence. White conceded as much to the district 
court (Tr., p.6, Ls.15-17), and the court minutes from the 2013 Case, which the 
district court took judicial notice of, support that co~clusion (augmentation).3 
"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights 
shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52. Given the limited and flexible due process 
confrontation right that exists in relation to probation revocation proceedings, and 
2 This view is also consistent with those decisions holding that the confrontation 
right at sentencing is limited and a defendant is not deprived of his constitutional 
rights when the court considers information attached to a presentence report. 
See, .sL9.:., Stat~ v. Martinez, 154 Idaho 940, 947, 303 P.3d 627, 634 (Ct. App. 
2013) ("the us1e of hearsay information in the PSI report does not violate a 
defendant's due process right to confrontation"). 
3 Contemporaneous with his brief, White filed a motion to augment the record 
with the minutes from the preliminary hearing held in the 2013 Case and the 
court's order binding him over to district court in that case. (Motion to Augment 
the Record and Statement in Support Thereof dated November 3, 2014.) The 
Idaho Supreme Court granted White's motion. (Order Granting Motion to 
Augment the Record dated November 10, 2014.) Copies of the documents 
augmented to the record are attached hereto as Appendix A 
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given the fact that White previously confronted the witness he apparently wanted 
to confront a second time at the revocation hearing, this Court should find any 
error in failing to conduct a good cause analysis to be harmless in this case. 
11. 
There Was Substantial Competent Evidence From Which The District Court 
Could Conclude, By A Preponderance Of The Evidence, That White Violated His 
Probation By Driving Under The Influence 
A. Introduction 
White contends the district court erred in finding he violated his probation 
by driving under the influence. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) First, White argues 
that by considering the court minutes and probable cause finding from the 2013 
Case, the district court "lowered the State's burden from a preponderance 
standard to a probable cause standard." 4 (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-14.) Second, 
White asserts that the district court's finding that he "violated the terms of his 
probation was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that 
finding." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Both of White's arguments fail. That the 
district court considered evidence from a hearing where the standard of proof 
was lower than a preponderance does not establish that the court applied that 
4 The state could not find any authority that compels a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. It appears White could not either as his argument that such a 
standard is required is based on an analogy to the standard for parole 
revocation. (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) Notably, in State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 
389, 744 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals noted: "proof of a 
probation violation beyond a reasonable doubt is not required. Here, both parties 
agreed to a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof. Accordingly, we 
need not decide whether any different standard is appropriate." The state will 
assume for the sake of argument in this brief that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard applies even though there is no clear authority that such a 
standard is required. However, the absence of clear authority on this point 
undermines White's claim that the district court applied an incorrect standard. 
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same standard to its revocation decision. With respect to White's claim that 
there was "no evidence" to support a finding that he violated his probation, White 
offers no authority to support his contention that "a probable cause determination 
and minutes of the preliminary hearing are not evidence and are not enough to 
establish, under the preponderance of the evidence, that [he] did in fact commit a 
new offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Even if the Court considers White's 
argument, the evidence considered by the district court was more than adequate 
to satisfy a preponderance of the evidence standard and supports the district 
court's finding that White violated his probation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[A] district court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal 
if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). This Court will accept the 
district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous" but "may freely 
review the district court's application of constitutional principles in light of the 
facts found." kl at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted). 
C. There Was Substantial Evidence To Support The District Court's Finding 
That White Violated His Probation 
As noted, the evidence considered by the district court in finding White 
violated his probation by driving under the influence was the court minutes and 
probable cause determination in the 2013 Case. (Tr., p.9 Ls.1-5; Appendix A.) 
White first argues that "his right to due process was violated when the district 
court revoked his probation based on a different judge's determination made 
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under a lower evidentiary standard than a preponderance of the evidence." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.) The district court's reliance on the court minutes and 
the probable cause determination in the 2013 Case falls far short of showing the 
district court applied an incorrect standard in making its revocation decision. 
There is nothing that would preclude a court from finding that the same evidence 
that establishes probable cause also satisfies a higher standard of proof and 
there is nothing in the record to support White's claim that the district court 
applied a probable cause standard to its decision. Cf. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490 
("Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues determined against him in other 
forums[.]"). The fact that the district court relied on the same evidence is not 
enough to conclude that the court applied an erroneous legal standard. White's 
reliance on Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 135 Idaho 208, 16 
P.3d 305 (Ct. App. 2000), does not support a contrary conclusion. (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) 
Brandt was on parole when he was arrested on a misdemeanor. Brandt, 
135 Idaho at 209, 16 P.3d at 306. "[O]n the day of his arrest he was also served 
with a parole violation warrant alleging two violations, one for the misdemeanor 
charge and one for consumption of alcohol." kl A magistrate found probable 
cause to support the new misdemeanor charge and set bond but refused to 
release Brandt "because he was also being held on the alleged parole violations 
for which bond is not authorized." kl In response, "Brandt filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus alleging that his due process rights had been violated because 
he had not been given a hearing to determine whether there was probable cause 
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to believe that he had violated his parole." kl The magistrate denied the 
petition, reasoning that the probable cause determination for the misdemeanor 
that formed the basis for one of the alleged parole violations "satisfied Brandt's 
right to a hearing to determine the existence of probable cause for the parole 
violation warrant." kl The Idaho Court of Appeals disagreed, concluding the 
probable cause determination in the misdemeanor proceeding was insufficient to 
meet the Morrissey "requirement for a preliminary probable cause determination 
on the reported parole violations." Brandt, 135 Idaho at 210-211, 16 P.3d at 307-
308. The Court of Appeals reached this conclusion "because the procedures for 
a probable cause determination in a misdemeanor case do not include the 
procedural safeguards mandated by Morrissey" since the misdemeanor probable 
cause hearing may be ex parte and does not require the defendant's presence. 
kl at 211, 16 P.3d at 308. The Court of Appeals' determination in Brandt that the 
court failed to comply with the procedural requirements under Morrissey has no 
bearing on White's claim that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard 
in its revocation decision. 5 
5 In citing Brandt, White also contends that the district court's "procedure" 
reduced the state's burden of proof and claims that the "district court's reliance 
on the magistrate's probable cause determination did not comport with the 
procedural safeguards set forth in Morrissey, because at the final revocation 
hearing there 'must be the basis for more than determining probable cause; it 
must lead to a final evaluation of any contested facts."' (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-
14 (quoting Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 487-488).) The state fails to understand how 
the district court's reliance on the documents associated with the 2013 Case 
violated any procedure required by Morrissey. The essential procedure required 
by due process is notice and an opportunity to be heard - those elements were 
satisfied in this case at both the preliminary hearing and the revocation hearing. 
16 
White next contends that, even assuming his due process rights were not 
violated, "the district court's finding that [he] violated the terms of his probation 
was clearly erroneous because there was no evidence to support that finding." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) According to White, "a probable cause determination 
and minutes of the preliminary hearing are not evidence and are not enough to 
establish, under the preponderance of the evidence, that [he] did in fact commit a 
new offense." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) This Court should decline to consider 
this claim because White cites no authority in support of the proposition that the 
documents the court considered "are not evidence." See Murray v. State, 156 
Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 718 (2014) (quoting State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.3d 966, 970 (1996) (noting an issue will not be considered if 
"either authority or argument is lacking" and declining to consider appellant's 
claim because he failed to "provide[] a single authority or legal proposition to 
support his argument"). 
Moreover, White did not object to the district court's consideration of the 
information from the 2013 Case on the basis that it is not "evidence." While 
White complained that the state "didn't offer a transcript or any evidence for [the 
court] to evaluate independently" (Tr., p.4, Ls.9-10), such a complaint is not the 
same as a claim that the proffered documents were not evidence at all or that the 
court could not consider the evidence. This Court should therefore decline to 
consider White's complaint that the 2013 Case documents are not "evidence." 
See State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885, 119 P.3d 653, 660 (Ct. App. 
2005) (citations omitted) ("Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1), a party 
17 
opposing proffered evidence must make a timely objection stating the specific 
ground of objection unless the specific ground is apparent from the context. An 
objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different basis for 
excluding the evidence."). 
Even if this Court considers White's argument, he is incorrect in his 
assertion that the 2013 Case minutes and the order binding White over are not 
properly considered as evidence. Documents may clearly be admitted and 
considered as evidence at a probation revocation hearing, Nez, 130 Idaho at 
955, 950 P.2d at 1294 ("A business record should be received into evidence 
unless the trial court doubts its reliability."); this is true even in a criminal trial, 
see,~. State v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 363-365, 283 P.3d 107, 110-112 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (penitentiary packet admissible under public records exception to 
establish persistent violator allegation). White's claim to the contrary lacks merit. 
White is also incorrect in his assertion that the challenged documents do 
not establish White drove under the influence. The court minutes reflecting 
Officer Daniel Koontz's testimony at the preliminary hearing in the 2013 Case 
about the circumstances under which he arrested White for driving under the 
influence were sufficient to support the district court's finding that White violated 
his probation by driving under the influence. Cf. State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 
510-511, 903 P.2d 95, 99-100 (Ct. App. 1995) ("there is no requirement that a 
judgment of conviction be a prerequisite to finding a probation violation when the 
alleged violation is the commission of a crime"). White has failed to demonstrate 
any error in this determination. 
18 
Because White has failed to show error in the process afforded at his 
revocation hearing or in the district court's determination that he violated his 
probation, White is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking White's probation. 
DATED this 2th day of January 2015. 
(JE$SICA M. LORELLO 
l99Puty Attorney General 
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Call8 case, OF pres, PA Art Verharen, DA Dougli,l$ Phelps 
'J :.u. .. ,,.===r,.,tt:: ~-~,ru:::::::::;:-~~ ~ 
Waives reading of complaint 
=~;=,;~~==--==,,,.~~...... .t~::::C..: ~e-1-t:;: wt!=--=====>-==={l 
Calls Daniel Koontz 
"*==='=J~oo=,==-==~== .. ~===-=~· )' u=..-=; ==v, 
0·1 :48:54 PM Swears to oath, states name and spells, Spirit Lake PD, POST 
certified, I was working on 12/20/'l 3 at '19:45 it was clarl<, vehicle 
was driving down private dirt road that not many vehlcles go on, 
boat launch Is open main stl'eet are~, w/in city of Spirit Lake 
Kootenai Cow1ty ID .. I saw vehicle <:mter boi:1t launch and turned 
Into laLrnch that H fish tailed then the vehicle stopped, I sa.w a 
male driv<:~r ~Jet out and walk cirow1d and enter pas::;enger side 
and fernc.110 enter drivers position and then they left the bof1t 
launch w/ out stopping, I witnessed a f allure to stop before 
entering the street. It was a SUV, I cont:;wted the driver as 




two occupants of vehicle. He was the same p<"?rson I saw get out 
of the drivers side earlier, HJ him m} Mlchaf.:i/ Dou~Jlas White. I · 
smelled odor of alcotiolJc beveragf). I asked him if he drove from 
the dirt road down to the boat launch he said "rlght1' he also stated 
he had 4M5 beers1 natural ice. I put hlrn through FST's. I have had 
training w/ FST1s, I gave him the HGM, and gave him the 
Instructions. I observed he was over the legal limit, he failed that 
test. I also gave him the walk and turn test and gave tile 
lnstructlons .. He had unstable balance and he did not do the tllrn 
properly. We were unable to do the one leg stand because he 
refused, I gave opportunity for a BAC. I asked if he was going to 
give me a breath sample he safd no. He stated he would blow 
over. I did put his statements in my report, reviews report. He 
stated he dldn1t want to incriminate himself and that he would 
blow over. I booked him Into jail, I filled out a prebool<lng sheet. I 
obtained his DOB it is
Offer$ PL's 1 certified judgment and sentenec 
o ·5 : No objection for. pllrposes o.f this hearing 
,01:57:00 EM J States 1 is admitted 
Q1 :57:04 EM PA No further questions 
1~;;;~;;;;;;;:;;:;~1~~~ ........ ~i.:...;..;...;.~.;.;;,,;.,.;;.;,~;..;.;,.;~=-===--====-===--===---~=~1 
01 :57:Q7 PM DA Cross 
The llghting conditions of the boating launch were dark, enough 
light for me to see someone exit the vehicle, I do not recall if their 
., La!l ot rn.A.:OURTROOM11 ori '>/21/2014 




was artificial light I'm not ~..;ure the color of the vehicle. I w1:w about 
·150 feet away from the vehicle. I saw the vehicle leave the road 
way and J,ead toward the:J dlri road. I asked the passen~Jer to get 
out of the car, because / had probable cause to believe he was 
DUI by his slurred speech. I never read him mlrarida warnings. I 
only knew the man aftel' I asl<ed for identification. I have nqt had 
contact w/ him before that. I have been an officer for 2 years1 
Spirit Lake Is the only office I have been on. I did POST through 
NIC about 2 ·112 years ago. I had a body camera on that night, 
nothing e!se. 
DA """"""J"'"N=ot=h-fr""'1g=f=u=rt=h-~eur==============~· -- ====""-"'=II 
PA Re direct 
02:DJ: 34 PM g~~:r Mr Whlt:ls present in court sitting right here wearing red coll:red l 
Koontz shi1t. The boat launch Is openn to the public. 
,02:02:11 P.M 
PA 
I would mov0 to amend complaint to confirm to the evidence, refer 
to page 2 on second S(·rntenGe. This is felony DUI bas.:)d on one 
oth0)r felony DUI w/in tile !21st ·f 6 Y$cirs 
''=02=--:=02=·-:=4a=· =P=M==i>=[=)A=-=="·"':::::o:o:b1=·=e={=.!=io!;·= .. ,. .c,, _,,,,,--==-,_.,,=====~, , ==:J 
02:02;5·1 PM£PA - . 'triking word twice and innerlineating once, one prior felony 
conviction w/in 15 years. 
l~.m.>====;i===;,==-.t.""1- ,"l:'!;IJ ~~,=-=~\e,:sz:::== __,.r,n==::n-~U,~•-
02;03:58 EM. PA mit It 
J.l .:ri.t1=• == =~"===-"'===<•-'=·· ==~::.;:._~\~··~-
02;04:02 PM DA o argt1ment 
,:t~ ~'""' ==f.=~~=-"'·======••'"-"'' ==""""'=~--==== 
02:04:05 PM ourt find$ state has 1net Its burden under 5.1 order holding to DC 
assigning to Judge Mitchell 
lltt====~==llo====~="""""'==~======1~~===...,,.,,=========~I 
04;04:36 PM end 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
vs. 
MJCHA)J:L DQVG!,.MJ V[HTfE 
DOB: 
FEl,ONY C.MJJZ IJ CR~~W13-00'..l4814 ORD.l1:R 
CHARG'.{l~(S): .f.'.O'Q'N'f.J.~llfil.Y.@ U.NJ)ER_T.BJ!: JNFLUENCE-('f.fIIijD 0~ ,'JU1~SEQIJEN'f Oli'FENS.E}-l18-80fMJ!: 
COUNT 2 - DJUVlNG WU]:!OIJT JJRIVlLEGEs-- WH!ill!!GD.i\;! 
Amended to:-----.~------,---~-----------------.--
£ J Dlsmissed - .insufficient ev!dc.nce to hold defendant to answer cbarge(s). [JBo,id exonerated. ( JNCO Lifted, 
(Specify d,lsmissed charge(s) on al.love Jine, j_f otbet charges still pending) 
[ ] Preliminary hen.dng having bee·n waived by the defendant on tile above listed cbarge(s), 
( 'l.¥'P.rellml11ary bearing having been Jield iJl the above entltlc:d .matter, and it appe:a.dng to tne that the offells6(s) set 
fortJJ above has/ have been committed, and thci:e is sufficient cause to believe the named defondaut is guilty 
thereof, 
tr 'J.S HEREBY OllDERE.D thnt tbe defondsht is 1ield to answer the above cha.rge(s) and fa bound over to Dfot.dct Court. 
The Prnsecutitlg Attorney ,shall Ille ap foformat\O.ll that includes all charges under this ct1se number. 
ff JS FUR1'J1ER ORDERED that the defendant be admitted to bail h1 the athount of$_" 
co.uuuitted to the custody of lh,e Kootenai County S1wriff pending the giving of such bail. 
:md ls 
[ ] befeJJdmit WM advlsed of the c)Jarges and powntial penaltielJ and of defendant' l5 rights, and having waived hl,9/hcr 
constitutional rights to: a) t1fol by jury; b) remain silent; ond c) confront witnesses, thcreafferpled guilty to the 
charge(s) contained in the Information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney. 
lT JS FURTI-Hm ORDERED thal all prel\fal motkms Ju t.bi~ case shall be tiled not Jater than 42 days aft{lr the date 
of this order unless ordered otJ1erwisc. All such p:r:et:rial motioJJS Ju this matter slrnH be accompanied by a brief 1n support of the 
mot.ion, aud a notice of hearing for a date scheduled tbrottgh the Court. 
THJS CASE JS ASSJGNED TO JUDGE j O htxJ l-u a~, ) 
ENTERED this _Z,t day of r~ h,r":fC~'7-' 20__}_'-/_. ..---~ 
. 4~ ~ ..-~-2 
Copies seut~ \ / \l~ as follows: 
\c£l'rosecutor \ C. - 14Def:ose Atton1ey __ \___ C..., ___ ~Defendimt --'-c=--
( J Assigned 1'8{1fot Judge: ( ]interoffice delivery C )faxed _____ _ 
[ ) TCA Office at fa.:x. 446-12.24 
J Jnl1 (if in custody at fax 446-l407) 
( J KCSO Records fax 446-1307 (re: NCO) 
Orde1· Holding Defendnnt/.DisrnissJng Case 
Rev'l/13 
